403, 'back_link' => true]);
}
// Show the informational upgrade card (feature name + description + Upgrade link).
if (class_exists('WPMM_Premium_Gate')) {
$name = class_exists('WPMM_Plans') ? WPMM_Plans::feature_label($feature) : ucwords(str_replace('_', ' ', $feature));
$desc = self::pro_feature_desc($feature);
WPMM_Premium_Gate::render_locked($name, $desc, $feature);
}
}
public static function pro_feature_desc_public($feature) { return self::pro_feature_desc($feature); }
protected static function pro_feature_desc($feature) {
$d = [
'waf_rules_manager' => 'Turn individual firewall rules on or off and test them safely before enabling.',
'outbound_monitor' => 'See every outside server your site connects to, and block suspicious ones.',
'security_baseline' => 'Snapshot your secure configuration and get alerted when anything drifts from it.',
'scan_secrets' => 'Find API keys, passwords and private keys accidentally left in your files.',
'scan_media' => 'Detect malware and code hidden inside images and other media uploads.',
'scan_js_skimmer' => 'Detect malicious JavaScript and payment-card skimmers on your pages.',
'vendor_drift' => 'Spot unexpected changes inside premium plugins you installed from vendors.',
'multisite_hub' => 'Manage and scan all your client sites from one dashboard.',
'soar_playbooks' => 'Run automatic response steps the moment an incident is detected.',
'custom_login_url' => 'Move wp-login.php to a private address only you know.',
'login_recaptcha' => 'Add a CAPTCHA to the login form to stop automated attacks.',
];
return $d[$feature] ?? 'This feature is part of the Silent Threads Security Pro add-on.';
}
public static function init() {
add_action('admin_init', [__CLASS__, 'maybe_redirect_legacy_security_hub']);
add_action('admin_menu', [__CLASS__, 'register_menu']);
add_action('admin_enqueue_scripts', [__CLASS__, 'enqueue_assets']);
add_action('admin_enqueue_scripts', [__CLASS__, 'enqueue_console'], 999);
add_action('admin_head', [__CLASS__, 'menu_icon_style']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_settings', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_settings']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_download_forensic_bundle', [__CLASS__, 'handle_download_forensic_bundle']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_regenerate_key', [__CLASS__, 'handle_regenerate_key']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_registration_lockdown', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_registration_lockdown']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_toggle_waf_rule', [__CLASS__, 'handle_toggle_waf_rule']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_toggle_waf_engine', [__CLASS__, 'handle_toggle_waf_engine']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_new_user_approval', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_new_user_approval']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_registration_guard', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_registration_guard']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_fingerprint_settings', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_fingerprint_settings']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_scan_all_sites', [__CLASS__, 'handle_scan_all_sites']);
add_action('wp_ajax_wpmm_scan_step', [__CLASS__, 'handle_scan_step']);
add_action('wp_ajax_wpmm_refresh_attack_stream', [__CLASS__, 'handle_refresh_attack_stream']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_playbook', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_playbook']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_community_blocklist', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_community_blocklist']);
if (class_exists('WPMM_WAF_Sandbox')) add_action('wp_ajax_wpmm_test_waf_rule', ['WPMM_WAF_Sandbox', 'handle_test_rule']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_delete_playbook', [__CLASS__, 'handle_delete_playbook']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_stego_scan_now', [__CLASS__, 'handle_stego_scan_now']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_js_scan_now', [__CLASS__, 'handle_js_scan_now']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_js_update_status', [__CLASS__, 'handle_js_update_status']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_add_trusted_ip', [__CLASS__, 'handle_add_trusted_ip']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_country_blocking', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_country_blocking']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_save_rate_limits', [__CLASS__, 'handle_save_rate_limits']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_remove_trusted_ip', [__CLASS__, 'handle_remove_trusted_ip']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_stego_update_status', [__CLASS__, 'handle_stego_update_status']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_register_vendor_baseline', [__CLASS__, 'handle_register_vendor_baseline']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_remove_vendor_baseline', [__CLASS__, 'handle_remove_vendor_baseline']);
add_action('admin_post_wpmm_check_vendor_drift', [__CLASS__, 'handle_check_vendor_drift']);
}
public static function handle_save_community_blocklist() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_save_community_blocklist');
if (class_exists('WPMM_Community_Blocklist')) {
WPMM_Community_Blocklist::set_enabled(!empty($_POST['enabled']));
if (class_exists('WPMM_Activity_Log')) {
WPMM_Activity_Log::log('community_blocklist_setting_changed', 'site', 'Community blocklist ' . (!empty($_POST['enabled']) ? 'enabled' : 'disabled') . ' by an administrator.');
}
}
wp_safe_redirect(add_query_arg(['view' => 'security-center', 'subtab' => 'overview', 'blocklist_saved' => 1], admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-dashboard')));
exit;
}
public static function handle_save_playbook() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('soar_playbooks')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_save_playbook();
self::pro_unavailable('soar_playbooks', true);
}
public static function handle_delete_playbook() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('soar_playbooks')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_delete_playbook();
self::pro_unavailable('soar_playbooks', true);
}
public static function handle_refresh_attack_stream() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_send_json_error('Forbidden', 403);
check_ajax_referer('wpmm_refresh_attack_stream', 'nonce');
if (!class_exists('WPMM_Attack_Stream')) wp_send_json_error('Not available');
$stream = WPMM_Attack_Stream::get_recent_attacks(15);
ob_start();
if (empty($stream)) {
echo '
No attack activity recorded yet across the WAF, Firewall, or Honeypot.
';
} else {
foreach ($stream as $evt) {
echo '
';
echo '
' . esc_html($evt['time']) . '
';
echo '
' . esc_html($evt['ip'] ?: '—') . '
';
echo '
' . esc_html($evt['country'] ?: '—') . '
';
echo '
' . esc_html($evt['attack_type']) . '
';
echo '
' . esc_html($evt['endpoint'] ?: '—') . '
';
echo '
' . esc_html(ucfirst($evt['action'])) . '
';
echo '
' . esc_html($evt['source']) . '
';
echo '
';
}
}
$html = ob_get_clean();
wp_send_json_success(['html' => $html, 'count' => count($stream), 'refreshed_at' => current_time('mysql', true)]);
}
public static function handle_scan_step() {
check_ajax_referer('wpmm_scan_step', 'nonce');
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_send_json_error(['message' => 'Permission denied'], 403);
$step = isset($_POST['step']) ? sanitize_key($_POST['step']) : '';
if (!class_exists('WPMM_Plans') || !WPMM_Plans::step_allowed($step)) {
wp_send_json_error(['message' => 'Not included in your current plan', 'locked' => true], 403);
}
switch ($step) {
case 'malware':
$requested = isset($_POST['profile']) ? sanitize_key($_POST['profile']) : '';
$profile = in_array($requested, ['standard', 'deep'], true) ? $requested : WPMM_Plans::malware_profile_for_full_scan();
if ($profile === 'deep' && !WPMM_Plans::allows('scan_deep')) $profile = 'standard';
$result = WPMM_Scanner::run_scan($profile);
wp_send_json_success(['message' => $result['files_scanned'] . ' files scanned, ' . $result['issues_found'] . ' issue(s) found']);
break;
case 'database':
$result = WPMM_DB_Scanner::run_scan('deep');
$total = array_sum($result);
wp_send_json_success(['message' => $total . ' issue(s) found across all tables']);
break;
case 'attack_surface':
WPMM_Attack_Surface::run_scan();
$score = WPMM_Attack_Surface::get_score();
wp_send_json_success(['message' => 'Score: ' . $score['score'] . '/100']);
break;
case 'vulnerabilities':
WPMM_Vulnerability_Scanner::run_scan();
$summary = WPMM_Vulnerability_Scanner::get_summary();
wp_send_json_success(['message' => $summary['outdated'] . ' outdated of ' . $summary['total']]);
break;
case 'persistence':
WPMM_Persistence_Scanner::run_scan();
$findings = WPMM_Persistence_Scanner::get_findings('open');
wp_send_json_success(['message' => count($findings) . ' finding(s)']);
break;
case 'configuration':
if (class_exists('WPMM_Configuration_Security')) {
WPMM_Configuration_Security::run_scan();
$findings = WPMM_Configuration_Security::get_findings('open');
wp_send_json_success(['message' => count($findings) . ' issue(s) found']);
} else {
wp_send_json_success(['message' => 'skipped']);
}
break;
case 'secrets':
if (class_exists('WPMM_Secret_Scanner')) {
WPMM_Secret_Scanner::run_scan();
$findings = WPMM_Secret_Scanner::get_findings('open');
wp_send_json_success(['message' => count($findings) . ' finding(s)']);
} else {
wp_send_json_success(['message' => 'skipped']);
}
break;
case 'steganography':
if (class_exists('WPMM_Steganography_Scanner')) {
$result = WPMM_Steganography_Scanner::run_scan();
wp_send_json_success(['message' => $result['scanned'] . ' image(s) checked, ' . $result['flagged'] . ' flagged']);
} else {
wp_send_json_success(['message' => 'skipped']);
}
break;
case 'js_malware':
if (class_exists('WPMM_JS_Scanner')) {
$result = WPMM_JS_Scanner::run_scan();
wp_send_json_success(['message' => $result['scanned'] . ' script(s) checked, ' . $result['flagged'] . ' flagged']);
} else {
wp_send_json_success(['message' => 'skipped']);
}
break;
case 'correlation':
if (class_exists('WPMM_Incident')) {
$result = WPMM_Incident::run_correlation();
wp_send_json_success(['message' => $result['created'] . ' new incident(s), ' . $result['updated'] . ' updated']);
} else {
wp_send_json_success(['message' => 'skipped']);
}
break;
default:
wp_send_json_error(['message' => 'Unknown scan step']);
}
}
public static function handle_scan_all_sites() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('multisite_hub')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_scan_all_sites();
self::pro_unavailable('multisite_hub', true);
}
// The menu shows on every admin screen: size the logo icon to WordPress's 20px slot at full colour.
public static function menu_icon_style() {
// Our own menu item only (the rest of the WordPress menu keeps the user's admin colour scheme):
// when it is the open section, Deep Burgundy with a gold edge instead of the scheme's blue.
echo '' . "\n";
}
public static function register_menu() {
add_menu_page(
'Silent Threads Security',
'Silent Threads',
'manage_options',
'wpmm-dashboard',
[__CLASS__, 'render_dashboard'],
WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/brand/menu-icon.png',
80
);
add_submenu_page('wpmm-dashboard', 'Dashboard', 'Dashboard', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-dashboard', [__CLASS__, 'render_dashboard']);
add_submenu_page(null, 'This Site\'s Findings', 'This Site\'s Findings', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-findings', function () { self::standalone('render_findings'); });
add_submenu_page(null, 'Settings', 'Settings', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-settings-hub', function () { self::standalone('render_settings_hub'); });
if (class_exists('WPMM_Step_Up_Auth')) add_submenu_page(null, 'Verify Action', 'Verify Action', 'read', 'wpmm-step-up-verify', ['WPMM_Step_Up_Auth', 'render_verify_page']);
add_submenu_page('wpmm-dashboard', 'Security Scanners', 'Security Scanners', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-security-hub', function () { self::standalone('render_security_hub'); });
add_submenu_page('wpmm-dashboard', 'Hardening Center', 'Hardening Center', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-hardening', function () { self::standalone('render_hardening'); });
add_submenu_page('wpmm-dashboard', 'Settings', 'Settings', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-settings-redirect', '__return_null');
add_submenu_page(null, 'Investigate Change', 'Investigate Change', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-investigate', function () { self::standalone('render_investigate'); });
add_submenu_page(null, 'IP Detail', 'IP Detail', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-ip-detail', function () { self::standalone('render_ip_detail'); });
add_submenu_page(null, 'Site Detail', 'Site Detail', 'manage_options', 'wpmm-site-detail', function () { self::standalone('render_site_detail'); });
}
public static function enqueue_assets($hook) {
if (strpos($hook, 'wpmm-') === false) return;
$css_path = WPMM_PLUGIN_DIR . 'assets/admin.css';
$mtime = file_exists($css_path) ? filemtime($css_path) : 0;
$version = WPMM_VERSION . '.' . $mtime;
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-brand-tokens', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/brand-tokens.css', [], WPMM_VERSION);
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-admin', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/admin.css', ['wpmm-brand-tokens'], $version);
$page = sanitize_key(wp_unslash($_GET['page'] ?? ''));
if ($page !== 'wpmm-dashboard' && strpos($page, 'wpmm-v2-preview') === false) {
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-v2-design-system', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/v2-design-system.css', [], WPMM_VERSION);
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-v3-shared', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/v3-shared.css', ['wpmm-v2-design-system', 'wpmm-admin'], WPMM_VERSION);
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-v3-components', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/v3-components.css', ['wpmm-v3-shared'], WPMM_VERSION);
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-v3-dark', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/v3-dark-theme.css', ['wpmm-v3-components'], WPMM_VERSION);
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-console', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/console.css', ['wpmm-v3-dark', 'wpmm-brand-tokens'], WPMM_VERSION);
}
if ($page === 'wpmm-license') wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-license-modal', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/license-modal.css', [], WPMM_VERSION);
}
/**
* The security-console skin (assets/st-console.css): the plugin's one visual layer. Runs last
* (priority 999) on the plugin's own screens and depends on every plugin stylesheet already
* queued, so it always prints after them. Styling only; no behaviour is attached here except
* the "reveal" button for masked secrets, which only changes what is shown on screen.
*/
public static function enqueue_console($hook) {
$page = sanitize_key(wp_unslash($_GET['page'] ?? ''));
if (strpos($page, 'wpmm-') !== 0 && strpos((string) $hook, 'wpmm-') === false) return;
$deps = array_values(array_filter(wp_styles()->queue, function ($h) { return strpos($h, 'wpmm-') === 0; }));
$path = WPMM_PLUGIN_DIR . 'assets/st-console.css';
$ver = WPMM_VERSION . '.' . (file_exists($path) ? filemtime($path) : 0);
wp_enqueue_style('wpmm-st-console', WPMM_PLUGIN_URL . 'assets/st-console.css', $deps, $ver);
wp_register_script('wpmm-st-console', false, [], $ver, true);
wp_enqueue_script('wpmm-st-console');
wp_add_inline_script('wpmm-st-console', "document.addEventListener('click',function(e){var b=e.target.closest&&e.target.closest('[data-stc-reveal]');if(!b)return;var t=document.getElementById(b.getAttribute('data-stc-reveal'));if(!t)return;if(t.tagName==='INPUT'){var show=t.type==='password';t.type=show?'text':'password';b.textContent=show?'Hide':'Show';}else{var on=t.hasAttribute('data-stc-masked');if(on){t.textContent=t.getAttribute('data-stc-value');t.removeAttribute('data-stc-masked');b.textContent='Hide';}else{t.setAttribute('data-stc-masked','1');t.textContent=t.getAttribute('data-stc-mask');b.textContent='Show';}}});");
}
public static function standalone($method) {
echo '
Emergency Lockdown completed. Check the Activity Log for the full step-by-step result.
Emergency LockdownIf you believe this site is currently compromised, this immediately rotates all authentication keys (signing everyone out), suspends every OTHER administrator account pending your review, blocks new registrations, enables the plugin/theme install lockdown, and takes a database backup - all of this plugin's individual response tools run in the correct order, in one click.
$label): ?>
0, 'critical' => 0];
$persistence_open = 0;
$vuln_summary = ['outdated' => 0];
$config_open = 0;
$admin_flags = 0;
if (class_exists('WPMM_Persistence_Scanner')) $persistence_open = count(WPMM_Persistence_Scanner::get_findings('open'));
if (class_exists('WPMM_Vulnerability_Scanner')) $vuln_summary = WPMM_Vulnerability_Scanner::get_summary();
if (class_exists('WPMM_Configuration_Security')) $config_open = count(WPMM_Configuration_Security::get_findings('open'));
if (class_exists('WPMM_User_Security')) {
foreach (WPMM_User_Security::scan_admin_accounts() as $row) {
if (!empty($row['flags'])) $admin_flags++;
}
}
?>
0]; ?>
Correlation complete - new incident(s) created from existing evidence.
Setting saved.
Security Control Tamper Watchdog - watches this plugin's own critical protections (WAF, 2FA, containment, and others) in real time and immediately logs and alerts if one is ever turned off unexpectedly. Turning a protection ON is never flagged - only OFF transitions are.
No security controls have been disabled - nothing to review.
Control
Disabled By
When
UTC
WP-CLI Persistence Guard - this plugin's own WAF and rate-limiting only ever see HTTP requests; an attacker with shell access (via a webshell, compromised SSH key, etc.) could bypass them entirely using WP-CLI. This surfaces privileged changes (new users, role changes, plugin/theme changes, cron modifications) made specifically through WP-CLI, distinct from the same changes made via a normal web request.
No privileged changes made via WP-CLI recorded yet.
Category
Description
When
UTC
Automated Self-Audit - scans this plugin's own installed code weekly for the same vulnerability classes checked during development (admin-post handlers missing capability/nonce checks, unescaped output of user input). This never modifies or blocks anything - it exists to catch a genuine future regression automatically.
Self-audit has not run yet - it will run automatically within the next 24 hours, or check back after the weekly schedule.
Last run: UTC - no issues found.
Last run: UTC
Severity
Category
Details
File
Live CVE Correlation - checks every active plugin and theme's genuine installed version against the free, community WPVulnerability.net database for a specific, matching, named CVE - not just "an update is available". This is deliberately distinct from the outdated-software check elsewhere: a plugin can be fully up to date and still have zero CVE matches here, or be one version behind and have a serious one.
CVE correlation has not run yet - it will run automatically within the next few hours.
Last checked: UTC - no installed component's exact version matched a known CVE.
Last checked: UTC
Severity
Component
Installed
CVE
Description
()
Retention policy saved.
Data Retention - keeps this plugin's own raw event-log tables (firewall events, login attempts, file-integrity events, honeypot hits, WAF events, and similar) from growing without bound, by removing entries older than the configured period. This deliberately never touches findings, incidents, baselines, or the immutable Activity Log - only raw, high-volume event history that has no ongoing evidentiary value once its window passes.
Containment policy saved.
Automatic Attack Containment - a stronger response than IP-blocking alone, for High and Critical incidents specifically: revoking involved users' sessions, triggering a full scan, and - at Critical severity only - suspending involved accounts outright and running a core-integrity scan. Deliberately opt-in and off by default: this takes real, disruptive action (logging out a user, suspending a login) automatically, so a site owner should decide to enable it rather than have it silently active.
Recommendations below are based only on findings this plugin has actually detected on this site.
Security Recommendations
0) $recs[] = ['high', $vuln_summary['outdated'] . ' outdated component(s) - update from the Vulnerabilities tab.'];
if ($persistence_open > 0) $recs[] = ['critical', $persistence_open . ' unreviewed persistence finding(s) - review on the Persistence Scanner tab.'];
if ($config_open > 0) $recs[] = ['medium', $config_open . ' configuration issue(s) - review on the Configuration Security tab.'];
if ($admin_flags > 0) $recs[] = ['medium', "$admin_flags administrator account(s) flagged for review - see User Security."];
if (empty($recs)) : ?>
No open recommendations right now.
Emergency Lockdown
Emergency Lockdown activated.
Lockdown rolled back - settings restored.
LOCKDOWN ACTIVE
Emergency Lockdown is currently active on this site. All changes are reversible.
For when this site is actively under attack or suspected compromised. This is a manual, deliberate action - nothing here happens automatically. Every change is reversible with one click.
Last checked: . Cross-site checks only work for sites monitored in agent mode (this plugin installed on them too).
Showing only open incidents - marking one Investigating, Contained, Resolved, or a False Positive moves it out of this view. Use the "All" tab to see everything.
Which stages of a genuine attack progression this incident's own signals have been observed in - mapped from this plugin's existing detections, not a separate detection system.
Attack Timeline
—
()
Evidence
Source IP(s)
Files Mentioned
Users Mentioned
Domains Mentioned
Evidence above is extracted only from this incident's own recorded timeline - nothing here is inferred beyond what those events actually mention.
Attack Path
Not enough distinct steps to chart a path.
$step): ?>
→
Actions
Snapshots for This Incident
Severity
Created
UTC
Status
File-level forensics (before/after diffs for a specific change) live on the Security Baseline tab. This page covers point-in-time security-state snapshots instead - useful for preserving evidence before you clean up a compromised site.
Showing only unreviewed findings - once you mark something Reviewed, Ignored, Resolved, or Trusted, it moves out of this view. Use the "All" tab to see everything.
No findings here. Nothing to worry about.
Baseline created/updated for files.
How this works: checks run automatically every 15 minutes for uploads, themes, and plugins (the priority areas requested). This isn't truly instant - PHP has no OS-level file-watch API on typical hosting - but 15 minutes is far tighter than the weekly full malware scan. Changes made through WordPress itself (an update, activating a plugin, saving a theme file) are automatically marked "expected" and shown separately from unexplained changes.
This value is PHP-serialized - editing it directly here risks corrupting the record, so no automatic fix is offered. Please review . manually.
Write Activity (Behavioral Anomaly Detection)
Tracks how often each core table is written to, and compares each hour against that table's own historical average for that hour - flags a genuine spike (20x+ normal, with at least 25 writes) rather than just static content. Runs via WordPress's own query hook, so it needs no special server access.
No write activity recorded yet in the last 24 hours.
Table
Date
Hour
Writes
:00
Sensitive Database Write Monitoring
Watches security-critical database writes directly - not through any WAF request-level rule, since a direct database write (e.g. from a webshell) never involves an HTTP request to inspect. Currently covers: the active_plugins option (catches a plugin silently activated by manipulating the database directly, bypassing the normal admin screen entirely) and new Application Password creation (a standing credential an attacker with brief access might create to persist).
Fetches your homepage twice - once as an ordinary visitor, once as Googlebot - and compares them. A large difference can mean the site is showing search engines different content than real visitors (a technique used to inject SEO spam without visitors noticing).
Could not complete the check.
Possible Cloaking
The page shown to Googlebot is only % similar to what an ordinary visitor sees - review the homepage source for hidden content or user-agent-conditional code.
No cloaking detected - content shown to Googlebot and ordinary visitors is % similar.
Findings ()
No open attack surface findings.
Evidence:
Recommendation:
What this checks: whether core/plugins/themes are up to date, using WordPress's own official update-check data. This is not a CVE database - matching against a specific named vulnerability requires a paid third-party API (WPScan/Patchstack), which isn't configured here. Staying up to date is still the single most effective thing you can do, since most real-world compromises exploit already-patched, publicly known bugs in outdated software.
Components Checked
Outdated
Last Checked
Component
Type
Installed
Latest
Status
No data yet - run a check.
Outdated' : 'Current'; ?>
Open Findings
Tracked MU-Plugins/Drop-ins
Last Scan
Findings
No persistence mechanisms found.
· Confidence:
Recommendation:
Tracked MU-Plugins & Drop-ins
File
First Seen
Last Modified
None found on this site.
Applied:
Plugin/theme installation temporarily allowed - it will turn back off automatically when the window ends.
This site does not appear to be using HTTPS. "Secure Admin Cookies" and "Force HTTPS" cannot be safely auto-enabled until HTTPS is working - enabling them without a valid SSL certificate could lock you out of wp-admin. Set up HTTPS first, then return here.
Security Check
Description
Status
$meta): ?>
ONOFF Temporarily allowed until
Automatically turns back off on its own when the window ends - no need to remember to re-enable it.
Requires HTTPS first
✓ Enabled
Public Self-Registration
If this site never expects a random visitor to create their own account (most business/brochure sites, and even most WooCommerce stores where checkout doesn't require a real account), disabling this entirely removes an entire class of attack surface - there's simply no registration form left for a bot or attacker to abuse.
Manual Steps (for Nginx, or if a fix above couldn't write to disk)
Protect wp-config.php (Nginx):
location ~* wp-config\.php { deny all; }
Disable directory listing (Nginx):
autoindex off;
Admin security report emailed.
Block Suspicious Auto-Generated Usernames
Saved.
Prevents a NEW account from ever being created (not just detecting it afterward) when its username matches a known auto-generated/malware pattern - a generic prefix (wp, admin, support, backup, user, service...) directly followed by a short, meaningless run of random-looking characters. This is exactly the kind of username real attack tools generate when creating a rogue account, and something a genuine human choosing their own username essentially never produces. Applies only to brand-new accounts - never affects existing users.
Strong Password Policy
Saved.
WordPress's built-in password-strength meter is only a visual suggestion - it never actually stops a weak password from being saved. Turning this on for a role requires at least 12 characters, a mix of character types, and checks the password against HaveIBeenPwned's database of known-breached passwords - only the first 5 characters of a secure hash are ever sent for that check, never the password itself.
Post-incident hygiene: invalidate every active session, instantlyRotates WordPress's own authentication salts in wp-config.php. This immediately signs EVERYONE out of the site - every browser, every device, every user, including you right now - regardless of whether an attacker's specific session was ever identified. A safety backup of wp-config.php is taken automatically before any change, and is restored automatically if anything goes wrong.
Last rotation:
Notifications
Settings saved.
Test alert accepted by this site's mail system. WordPress cannot confirm that it reached the inbox, so check your inbox (and spam folder).
The test alert could not be sent. This site's mail system refused it, so the server's outgoing mail may not be set up. ' . esc_html($wpmm_fail['reason']) . '. ' . esc_html(WPMM_Email_Diagnostics::explain($wpmm_fail['reason'])); } ?> Check email delivery.
Events that trigger an alert: malware detected, new PHP file created, core file modified, admin user created, brute-force attack, firewall block spike, plugin/theme file modified, security score dropped.
Email Digest
Digest settings saved.
Instead of sending one email per event (which can arrive far too frequently to be useful), batch every event into a single, table-formatted summary email sent at a regular interval - similar to how Wordfence's own security digest works. Events are grouped into clear sections (Blocked IPs & Firewall, Accounts & Logins, Malware & Scan Findings, Other) with severity, description, and time for each. No digest is ever sent for an interval with zero events - this only reduces email volume, it never adds an empty one.
Digest sent - or nothing was queued, in which case nothing was sent.
0): ?>
Backup created.
Database restored. A snapshot of the previous database was automatically saved first.
Database backups can be restored with one click (a safety snapshot of the current database is always taken first). File backups are downloadable but must be restored manually - automatically overwriting a live site's files is one of the easiest ways to make a bad situation worse, so that step is intentionally left in your hands.
Reports are generated automatically every week, or on demand below. Each is a self-contained HTML page - open it and use your browser's "Print → Save as PDF" to get a PDF to send a client.
Tier 1 (always on): wraps WordPress's own file-write API (used by core/plugin/theme installers and well-behaved plugins) - blocks writes to wp-config.php, the root .htaccess, or any .php file inside uploads/ unless it's part of a genuine WordPress update.
Tier 2 (advanced, opt-in): also intercepts raw PHP file-write calls (fwrite/file_put_contents) that bypass WordPress's own API entirely - this catches more, including most real-world malware, but is a more invasive technique. Test thoroughly after enabling before relying on it.
How this works: unlike an exact-hash match (which only catches a byte-for-byte identical file), a fuzzy hash still recognizes a modified copy of a known malicious file - renamed variables, added comments/whitespace, minor edits - as "80% similar to WSO Shell", for example. It won't catch a file that's been heavily rewritten from scratch (that's what the signature/entropy/behavioral checks elsewhere in this plugin are for) - this is one extra layer, not a replacement for the others.
Signature added.
Step 1: Compute a Fuzzy Hash
Paste the content of a file you've confirmed is malicious (e.g. from Quarantine, or a sample you're investigating) to get its fuzzy hash.
Computed hash:
Copy this into the form below to save it as a known-family signature.
Step 2: Add a Signature
Known Signatures ()
This list is stored locally and can be extended at any time without a plugin update - just add entries here (or share/import a list from your own research).
No signatures added yet. Fuzzy-hash matching is skipped entirely until at least one is added.
Family
Threshold
Notes
Added
$sig): ?>
%
get_error_message())));
} else {
wp_safe_redirect(admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-security-hub&tab=firewall&trusted_added=1'));
}
exit;
}
public static function handle_remove_trusted_ip() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_remove_trusted_ip');
WPMM_Firewall::remove_trusted_ip(sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['entry'] ?? '')));
wp_safe_redirect(admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-security-hub&tab=firewall'));
exit;
}
public static function handle_save_country_blocking() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_save_country_blocking');
$mode = (isset($_POST['mode']) && $_POST['mode'] === 'allowlist') ? 'allowlist' : 'blocklist';
$countries = isset($_POST['countries']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['countries'])) : '';
$codes = array_filter(array_map(function ($c) {
return strtoupper(trim($c));
}, explode(',', $countries)));
$codes = array_values(array_unique($codes));
update_option(WPMM_Firewall::OPTION_COUNTRY_BLOCK_MODE, $mode);
update_option(WPMM_Firewall::OPTION_BLOCKED_COUNTRIES, $codes);
if (class_exists('WPMM_Activity_Log')) {
WPMM_Activity_Log::log('country_blocking_updated', 'site', "Country $mode set to: " . (empty($codes) ? 'none (disabled)' : implode(', ', $codes)));
}
wp_safe_redirect(admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-security-hub&tab=firewall&country_saved=1'));
exit;
}
public static function handle_save_rate_limits() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_save_rate_limits');
$limits = [];
foreach (['login', 'comments', 'rest_api', 'xmlrpc'] as $key) {
$limits[$key] = [
'limit' => sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['limit_' . $key] ?? '')),
'window' => sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['window_' . $key] ?? '')),
];
}
WPMM_Firewall::save_rate_limits($limits);
wp_safe_redirect(admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-security-hub&tab=firewall&rate_limits_saved=1'));
exit;
}
public static function handle_stego_update_status() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('scan_media')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_stego_update_status();
self::pro_unavailable('scan_media', true);
}
public static function handle_register_vendor_baseline() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('vendor_drift')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_register_vendor_baseline();
self::pro_unavailable('vendor_drift', true);
}
public static function handle_remove_vendor_baseline() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('vendor_drift')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_remove_vendor_baseline();
self::pro_unavailable('vendor_drift', true);
}
public static function handle_check_vendor_drift() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('vendor_drift')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_check_vendor_drift();
self::pro_unavailable('vendor_drift', true);
}
public static function render_hub() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('multisite_hub')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::render_hub();
self::pro_unavailable('multisite_hub', false);
}
public static function render_outbound() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('outbound_monitor')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::render_outbound();
self::pro_unavailable('outbound_monitor', false);
}
public static function render_investigate() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) return;
$id = isset($_GET['id']) ? (int) $_GET['id'] : 0;
$event = WPMM_File_Integrity::get_event($id);
if (!$event) {
echo '
"Local/Private" and a blank ASN/Org mean the IP is in a private/internal range (like 10.x.x.x) - these have no public country or ASN data. If most or all attacking IPs show as Local/Private on a live site, it usually means the site is behind a reverse proxy/CDN - this plugin already checks common forwarding headers (X-Forwarded-For, CF-Connecting-IP) to find the real visitor IP in that case.
Add this to your site's configuration to stop any PHP file in the uploads folder from ever executing, even if one gets planted there in the future. This works at a layer this plugin cannot reach on its own.
If you use Apache - add to wp-content/uploads/.htaccess:
<FilesMatch "\.(php|phtml|phar)$">
Require all denied
</FilesMatch>
This plugin watches for requests to a rotating set of fake "bait" file paths and AJAX actions that no legitimate visitor has any reason to request (e.g. .env, wp-config.php.bak, common webshell filenames). Any hit is treated as 100% confirmed malicious and the IP is instantly blocked - no scoring, no review needed, since nothing legitimate would ever trigger this.
Last rotated: UTC. Currently watching bait path(s) and bait AJAX action(s), rotated weekly so they can't be permanently fingerprinted.
Recent Honeypot Hits
No honeypot hits recorded - no confirmed attackers caught yet.
IP Address
Type
Target
When
Rate Limiting
Saved.
How many requests an IP can make to these commonly-abused endpoints before it's temporarily blocked. Defaults work for most sites - raise a limit if this site has heavy legitimate traffic on it (e.g. a very active comments section).
Country Blocking
Saved.
Block (or, in allowlist mode, only permit) frontend traffic from specific countries. This never affects a logged-in user, even browsing the front end from abroad, so the site owner can never be geography-locked-out of their own site.
Trusted IPs
A source here bypasses every firewall check entirely - never rate-limited, never WAF-scored, never auto-blocked. Use this for your own known office/home IP, or trusted services like uptime monitors (UptimeRobot) or site-management tools (ManageWP, MainWP) that make frequent, repetitive requests that could otherwise look like automated abuse.
Added to the trust list.
IP / Range
Label
Added
$meta): ?>
External IP Reputation
Saved.
Reliable IP-reputation services (AbuseIPDB, IPQualityScore, and similar) require a paid API subscription to use at any real production volume, so this plugin doesn't ship a specific commercial integration built-in - embedding one vendor's key/logic directly would force every site onto that one vendor's pricing. This toggle instead enables a documented integration point: if you already have (or later obtain) a subscription to a reputation service, wire it in via the wpmm_ip_reputation_lookup filter, and its score becomes one additional signal in the existing WAF confidence scoring - never an independent block/allow decision on its own. With no provider connected, this stays a complete no-op.
false, 'has_provider' => false]; ?>
Currently Blocked IPs ()
No IPs are currently blocked.
IP Address
Country
Risk Score
Category
Reason
Blocked By
Blocked At
0];
?>
UTC
Advanced WAF Rule Engine (356 Rules)
A 356-rule application-layer detection matrix covering SQL injection, XSS, LFI/RFI, RCE, obfuscation/decode-chains, SSRF, object injection, XXE, file-upload attacks, authorization/CSRF, authentication abuse, and WordPress/plugin-specific exploit patterns - all context-aware and confidence-scored rather than keyword-blacklist based, so an innocent word like "select" or "eval" in normal text is never treated as an attack on its own.
Rules Registered
Rules Implemented
Recent WAF Events
Rule
Route
Action
Confidence
Time (UTC)
%
No WAF events recorded yet.
Honeytoken Bait Files
Bait files planted.
Bait files removed.
Plants a handful of fake, realistic-looking "leaked" files (a backup wp-config.php, a database dump, an API-keys file) that no legitimate visitor, admin, or plugin has any reason to ever request. If any one of them is EVER accessed, the requesting IP is automatically blocked and a critical alert is sent immediately - catching an attacker while they're still searching your filesystem, before they ever reach whatever their real target was. This is the one detector in this plugin confident enough to auto-block without human review, precisely because there is no legitimate way to trigger it by accident.
Status:Active - bait file(s) planted:
Trigger History
File
IP Address
Time
Database Honeytoken
Database honeytoken account created.
Database honeytoken account removed.
A different tripwire from the file-based bait above: this plants a fake, unused Administrator account directly in the database. Nothing in wp-admin ever links to it, no email is ever sent about it, and no legitimate process has any reason to ever attempt logging into it - the only way anyone could learn this specific username exists at all is by reading the wp_users table directly (a SQL injection, a leaked database export, or a compromised database credential). Any login attempt against it, successful or not, is a strong signal of database-level compromise. The account itself has zero real privileges even if somehow logged into.
Compares your WordPress core files against the official checksums published by WordPress.org for your exact version. This is a much more reliable way to catch tampering in core files than pattern scanning, and "Repair" replaces a file with the genuine official copy rather than guessing.
No modified core files found. Your WordPress core matches the official release.
File
Missing Core Files ()
These files are part of the official WordPress release but were not found on this site.
This is often normal - many sites remove unused default themes
(Twenty Twenty-Three/Four/Five) or their font files, and that alone is not a sign
of compromise. Focus mainly on the "Modified Files" list above; treat this list as
lower-priority unless you see files you don't recognize removing on purpose.
File
Plugin Integrity Check
Extends the same official-checksum comparison to WordPress.org-hosted plugins - finds files that were planted in a plugin folder (never part of the official package) or files that were modified from the official release. Only works for plugins actually hosted on WordPress.org; premium/custom plugins have no public checksum registry to compare against and are skipped.
Checked WordPress.org-hosted plugin(s) ( skipped - not on WordPress.org or version not archived).
Extra/Planted Files
These files exist inside a plugin folder but were never part of the official WordPress.org package - a strong sign something was planted here:
Modified Files
These files don't match the official WordPress.org release for the installed version:
All checked plugins match their official WordPress.org release exactly.
Runtime Function-Call Protection
What this can and can't do: eval() is a PHP language construct, not a function - nothing (including this plugin) can disable or intercept it directly without a custom PHP build. What works: real functions like system/exec/shell_exec CAN be disabled server-side via disable_functions in php.ini (VPS/self-managed hosting only - shared hosting users typically can't edit php.ini and should ask their host). Once disabled, this plugin catches and instantly blocks any attempt to call them - a confirmed exploitation signal, not a guess.
Current status: Some dangerous functions are disabled - this protection is active.' : 'No dangerous functions currently disabled - add the snippet below to activate this protection.'; ?>
Recommended disable_functions value for your php.ini (includes anything already disabled, so pasting this won't accidentally re-enable something else):
Learned automatically during scans - if an existing, already-known plugin's files suddenly start calling a dangerous function they never used before, it's flagged as a possible sign of tampering (shown as a regular finding on this site's Findings page).
Tamper-Evident Log ChainEvery log entry's hash incorporates the previous entry's hash - if any row is ever directly edited or deleted at the database level, the chain breaks at that exact point and becomes provably detectable. Click "Verify Integrity" to check the entire chain now.Verified: all hashed entries are intact.Tampering detected - the chain breaks at log entry #. Everything before that entry verified correctly; that entry (or something after it, chained from it) does not match what it was originally recorded with.
A full history of every security action taken by this plugin - IP blocks, file quarantines/restores/deletions, repairs, and core file restores.
No activity recorded.
When
Action
Country
Target
By
Details
UTC
Two-Factor Authentication
Settings saved.
Backup Codes
Each user manages their own backup codes from their profile page: Your Profile. As an administrator, you can also generate new ones for another user from their user edit page.
Emails are sent using wp_mail(), so they will go out through whatever mail/SMTP setup this site already has (e.g. an SMTP plugin, if one is active). If codes aren't arriving, check that mail sending is working on this site first.
403, 'back_link' => true]);
}
public static function handle_save_settings() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_save_settings');
$source = isset($_POST['sites_source']) && $_POST['sites_source'] === 'api' ? 'api' : 'manual';
$api_url = isset($_POST['sites_api_url']) ? esc_url_raw(wp_unslash($_POST['sites_api_url'])) : '';
$api_auth = isset($_POST['sites_api_auth']) ? sanitize_text_field(wp_unslash($_POST['sites_api_auth'])) : '';
if (class_exists('WPMM_Remote_Sites') && WPMM_Plans::allows('multisite_hub')) {
update_option(WPMM_Remote_Sites::OPTION_SOURCE, $source);
update_option(WPMM_Remote_Sites::OPTION_API_URL, $api_url);
update_option(WPMM_Remote_Sites::OPTION_API_KEY, $api_auth);
}
// Opt-in country lookups (sends IP addresses to our service). OFF unless ticked.
if (class_exists('WPMM_GeoIP')) {
update_option(WPMM_GeoIP::OPTION_ENABLED, isset($_POST['wpmm_geoip_enabled']) ? 1 : 0);
}
// Return to the screen the form was on (the old target, page=wpmm-settings, is not a registered page).
wp_safe_redirect(add_query_arg('geo_saved', '1', self::settings_return_url()) . '#wpmm-privacy');
exit;
}
/** Where to send the user after a settings form posted from a Silent Threads screen. */
private static function settings_return_url() {
$back = wp_get_referer();
if (!$back || strpos($back, 'page=wpmm') === false) {
$back = admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-dashboard&view=settings');
}
return remove_query_arg(['geo_saved', 'saved', 'regenerated'], $back);
}
public static function handle_regenerate_key() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_regenerate_key');
update_option('wpmm_api_key', wp_generate_password(40, false, false));
wp_safe_redirect(add_query_arg('regenerated', '1', self::settings_return_url()));
exit;
}
public static function handle_save_registration_lockdown() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_save_registration_lockdown');
update_option('wpmm_disable_public_registration', isset($_POST['disable_registration']) ? '1' : '0');
if (class_exists('WPMM_Activity_Log')) {
WPMM_Activity_Log::log('registration_lockdown_changed', 'site', 'Public self-registration disable-toggle set to ' . (isset($_POST['disable_registration']) ? 'ON' : 'OFF') . '.');
}
wp_safe_redirect(admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-dashboard&view=hardening&fixed=lockdown_new_registrations'));
exit;
}
public static function render_waf_rules() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('waf_rules_manager')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::render_waf_rules();
self::pro_unavailable('waf_rules_manager', false);
}
public static function handle_toggle_waf_rule() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('waf_rules_manager')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_toggle_waf_rule();
self::pro_unavailable('waf_rules_manager', true);
}
public static function handle_toggle_waf_engine() {
if (!current_user_can('manage_options')) wp_die('You do not have permission to do this.');
check_admin_referer('wpmm_toggle_waf_engine');
$enable = !empty($_POST['enable']);
if (!$enable && class_exists('WPMM_Step_Up_Auth')) {
WPMM_Step_Up_Auth::guard('wpmm_toggle_waf_engine');
}
update_option('wpmm_waf_engine_enabled', $enable);
if (class_exists('WPMM_Activity_Log')) {
WPMM_Activity_Log::log('waf_engine_toggled', 'site', 'The WAF engine was ' . ($enable ? 'enabled' : 'disabled') . '.');
}
wp_safe_redirect(admin_url('admin.php?page=wpmm-dashboard&view=waf-rules&toggled=1'));
exit;
}
public static function handle_save_new_user_approval() {
// Provided by the Silent Threads Security Pro add-on.
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('new_user_approval')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_save_new_user_approval();
wp_die(esc_html__('This feature needs the Silent Threads Security Pro add-on and a plan that includes it.', 'silent-threads-security'), '', ['response' => 403, 'back_link' => true]);
}
public static function handle_save_registration_guard() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('registration_guard')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_save_registration_guard();
self::pro_unavailable('registration_guard', true);
}
public static function handle_save_fingerprint_settings() {
if (class_exists('WPMM_Pro_Admin') && WPMM_Plans::allows('session_fingerprinting')) return WPMM_Pro_Admin::handle_save_fingerprint_settings();
self::pro_unavailable('session_fingerprinting', true);
}
}